This essay tries to reconstruct the reasons that lead Alasdair MacIntyre to make personal identity one of the central concepts of his moral theory. Especially in After Virtue, the identity of an individual is understood in a narrative sense: for the English philosopher we cannot identify a subject unless we include every moment of his life within the biographical history that characterizes him. And, on the other hand, MacIntyre believes, surprisingly, that this identity can be increased and made ontologically more solid the more the subject in question behaves morally. What are the justifications for this narrative identity? But above all, how to connect the proposal with the ontological possibility of making the individual identity all the more solid the more ethically acting? The text tries to answer these questions by finding the structure of the argument – albeit with different contents – in Aristotelian moral philosophy.
Keywords: Ethics, Personal Identity, Narrativity, Justice, Aristotle.
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